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ABSTRACT 
Ten years ago, our 1995 paper Ten Commandments of Formal 
Methods [5 ]  suggested some guidelines to help ensure the success of 
a formal methods project. It proposed ten important requirements 
(or “commandments”) for formal developers to consider and follow, 
based on our knowledge of several industrial application success 
stories, most of which have been reported in more detail in two 
books [17],[18]. The paper was surprisingly popular, is still widely 
referenced, and used as required reading in a number of formal 
methods courses. However, not all have agreed with some of our 
commandments, feeling that they may not be valid in the long-term. 
We re-examine the original commandments ten years on, and 
consider their validity in the light of a fiuther decade of industrial 
best practice and experiences. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.3.3 [Sofhvarek’rogram Verification]: Formal methods. 
General Terms 
Design, Economics, Experimentation, Human Factors, 
Standardization, Languages, Theory, Verification. 
Keywords 
Formal methods, correctness, industrial application, software 
engineering. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It  is clear to the best minds in the field that a more 
ma~heniatical approach is needed for sofiare to advance 
much. 
- Bertrand Meyer 
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We, as the formal methods community, are (presumably) 
convinced of the validity of formal approaches to software 
specification, design, implementation, and subsequent maintenance. 
In fact, it seems a logical argument to “Formal Methodists”, for 
whom formal methods are a “religion,” that the introduction of 
greater rigor into software development will result in improvements 
both in the software itself and in the development process. 
Unfortunately, the rest of the world (and the software 
engineering community, in particular) has not been convinced on a 
wide scale, despite a significant number of success stories [17],[ IS]. 
At least their existence is now acknowledged by most [8], and their 
usehlness is accepted by some [41]. Certain aspects of formal 
methods, such as assertions in programs [20], are widely used, 
although not as much as originally anticipated. However, many 
myths regarding formal methods, first identified as far back as 15 
years ago [6],[ 161 still abound. 
Holloway [22] points out that the typical argument in favor of 
formal methods (that software is bad, unique, and discontinuous; 
that testing is inadequate; and that formal methods are essential to 
avoid design flaws) is logically flawed, and unnecessarily complex 
(in logical terms). He proposes a simpler argument, which is both 
simple and logically valid: software engineers want to be “real” 
engineers; such engineers apply mathematics; and since formal 
methods is the mathematics of software engineering, software 
engineers should use formal methods. 
Nevertheless, formal methods are still not widely used outside 
the specialized formal methods community. Our original Ten 
Commandments of Formal Methods [5] were aimed at encouraging 
the practical use of formal methods among the software engineering 
community as a whole, and, more importantly, to provide some 
practical guidance to formal methods practitioners based on insights 
received fiom a number of real-life projects, many of which were 
reported in [17],[18]. The hture of foimal methods was also 
considered by others at around the same time [lo]. 
Given the lack of acceptance of the use of formal methods 
outside our own specialized group of people, the former was at best 
a vely limited success (or perhaps even a failure!). But we were 
considerably more successful in achieving the latter goal. 
Over the intervening ten years, we have received many 
comments and much feedback on our “commandments”. They have 
been widely cited, and included in several textbooks (e.g., see [36]) 
and are recommended (or even required) reading for a number of 
academic courses. Naturally, not everyone agrees with all of them. 
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They did not do so when we first published them in 1995, pointing 
out that many of them would not necessarily hold in the long term, 
so it is not surprising that not everyone agrees with them now. 
the T~~ Commandments of Formal 
Methods in the light of a further ten years of industrial best practice. 
However, the original intent of our commandment (“thou shalt 
choose an appropriate notation”) concerned a notation that was not 
“appropriate” in the sense that it was easily understood by non- 
specialists, but “appropriate” in that it was useful in describing the 
with that system. While 
several of the more popular notations (ex.. B. Z. CCS. CSP) have 
this paper, we 
at hand in a manner *at fits 
2. 
Any intelligeni fool can make ihings bigger and more 
complex ... It takes a touch of genius and a lot of courage io 
move in the opposite direction. 
- Albert Einstein (1879-1955) 
REVISITING THE COMMANDMENTS 
He proclaimed to you his covenant, which he commanded 
you to keep: the Ten Commandments, which he wrote on 
two tablets of sione. 
- Deut.4:13, 10:4, Ex.34:28 
I. Thou shalt choose an appropriate 
notation. 
Notations are a 3equent complaint ... but ihe real problem 
is to understand the meaning andproperties of the symbols 
and how they may and may not be manipulated, and to gain 
fluency in using ihem io express new problems, solutions 
and prooji. Final&* you will cultivate an appreciation of 
mathematical elegance and style. By that time, the symbols 
will be invisible; you will see straight through them to what 
they mean. The great advantage of mathematics is that the 
rules are simpler than those of natural language, and the 
vocabulary is much smaller. Consequent&, when presented 
with someihing unfamiliar it is possible to work out a 
solution for yourself; by logical deduction and invention 
rather than by consulting b o o b  or experts. 
- C.A.R. Hoare 
The use of mathematical notation is often cited as a reason for 
the slow uptake of formal methods and an inhibitor to their 
successful use in industrial applications. However, as we pointed out 
in [6], the mathematics of formal methods are actually relatively 
simple, and exploits notations and concepts that should be well- 
understood by computing professionals (set theory, propositional 
and predicate logic, etc.). While we concede that non-professionals 
may not be so au fait with such notations - which makes 
communication more difficult, in particular with system procurers, 
who in many cases are the people with whom the formal specifier 
most needs to communicate - in general, the notations are not 
beyond the understanding of well-educated software engineers. 
The formal methods community must also take some of the 
blame for this: all too often we find authors of technical papers 
introducing new symbols, Greek hieroglyphics, which are just 
alternative ways of representing existing operators and concepts. 
This kind of obfuscation should be avoided if possible. 
. .  . -  
emerged and have widespread applicability to a broad range of 
classes of system, it has been found in many cases that a 
combination of languages is needed to adequately address all 
aspects of a larger system. It has been argued that no single notation 
will ever be suitable to address all aspects of a complex system, with 
the implication that future systems will require combinations of 
model-based methods, process algebras, and temporal (and other) 
logics, in particular as we build more sophisticated, advanced, and 
ambitious systems. 
Table 1 illustrates just some of the wide range of “hybrid” formal 
methods that have emerged over the last decade, indicating a need to 
augment existing notations with concepts that address specific 
aspects of a system. These vary in the means by which they are 
combined, which we categorize as:’ 
Viewpoints (loosely coupled): different notations are used to 
present different “views” of a system with each notation 
making emphasis of, or understand of, a particular aspect of 
the system (e.g., representing timing constraints) [9]. 
Method Integration (close coupling): several different 
notations (both formal and informal or semi-formal) are 
used with (manual or automatic) translation between 
notations being used both to provide a semantics for the less 
formal notations and to enable graphical (or other) 
presentations that are well-understood, while simultaneously 
affording the benefits of formal verification [40]. 
Integrated Methods (tight couplingJ: multiple notations are 
used along with a single notation (e.g., propositional logic) 
used to give a uniform semantics to each notation [46]. 
At the time we published [5], method integration was very 
popular and it seemed that there would be a greater move towards 
Integrated Methods. While certainly there has been more progress in 
these fields, it seems that a Viewpoints approach has been winning 
out, perhaps due to reluctance by industry to take up full formal 
proof (that the more coupled approaches would support) and 
reluctance to get involved in semantic details. The Integrated 
Formal Methoak conference [2] continues to provide a forum for 
this research topic. 
Choosing thc right notation can great aid in abstraction, in 
hiding unnecessar); detail and unnecrssar?; complexity, where is 
where (many argue) the leal benefit offonnal melhods ci most be 
felt. 
ul could say it in usords there would he no reason iopaort 
-Edward Hopper (1882-1967) 
’ Our terminology and classification may differ from those of 
other authors. 
Table 1: A sample of some hvbrid formal methods 
Name 
Temporal 
B 
zccs 
CSP oz 
Object Z 
PiOZ 
II. 
Back in 
(developed since our 1995 paper [5]) .  
Combines Advantage Reference 
B, temporal Adds time to the B- Bonnet et 
logic Method al. (1 995) 
[I1 
z, CSP Combines Z and Fischer 
CSP (2000) [ 131 
x-calculus dynamic ai. (2004) 
[451 
Object-Z 
Thou shalt formalize but not 
over formalize. 
1995. we advocated the need to distinguish between - 
formalization “for the sake of it”, and appropriate use of 
formalization. We highlighted the fact that there were areas where 
foimal methods could be applied, but were not necessarily the most 
appropriate technique (e.g., user interface design). 
Indeed, it was also one of our Seven More Myths ojFormal 
Methods [6] that “formal methods people always use formal 
methods”; in reality, they do not. Also in [6], we advocated the use 
of formal methods when appropriate, and emphasized that many of 
the highly publicized projects touted as great success stories have in 
fact only involved formalizing small parts (often 10% or less) ofthe 
system. (We also reported that, regrettably, at that point most formal 
methods toolsets had not been formally developed. To our 
knowledge this is still largely the case, although PerfectDeveloper 
[ 1 I ]  has made some attempt in this direction.) 
The formal methods community has taken this somewhat to 
heart. Jones introduced the idea of lightweight formal methods with 
“Formal Methods Light” [39], which more or less equates to level 
zero of the three levels of formalization we proposed back in 1995, 
illustrated in Table 2. 
It is certainly true that much benefit can accrue through the use 
of formality only at the level of requirements specification (Level 0). 
The importance of getting requirements right at the outset cannot be 
overstated. Figure 1 shows a graph of investment in the 
requirements phase of NASA projects and missions plotted against 
the cost of project ovemns. The obvious “demand curve” 
emphasizes that getting requirements right has major payback later 
(or, conversely, that not getting requirements right will come back to 
haunt you later!). 
Table 2: Levels offormality. 
Level Name Involves 
0 Formal Specification Formal notation used for 
specifiing requirements 
only; no analysis/proof 
1 Formal Proving properties and 
Development/verification applying refinement 
CalCUlUS 
prover/checker to prove 
consistency and/or 
integrity. 
2 Machine Checked Proofs Use of theorem 
It is clear that the use of mathematically-based approaches has 
the potential to help eliminate errors early in the design process, 
rather than trying to remove them in the testing phase, or, worse, 
after deployment. Consequently, it i s  true that the use of formal 
methods in the initial stages of the development process can help to 
improve the quality of the later software, even if formal methods are 
not used in subsequent phases of development. 
Strange as it seems, no amount of learning can cure 
stupidity, and formal education positivelv fortiles it. 
- Stephen Vizinczey 
0 -  
ISEE 
Figure 1: Requirements phase costs compared with project oveiivn 
costs (source: W. Gruhl, NASA Comptroller’s Office). 
III. Thou shalt estimate costs. 
Earlier dr&s of our 1995 paper commanded “Thou shalt 
guestimate costs”. The term “guestimate”, a hybrid of “guess” and 
“estimate” was an attempt to indicate that this is far 60m a precise 
science, involving a lot of guesswork? 
Notwithstanding the existence of several excellent cost 
estimation models (such as CoCoMo 11, etc.), cost estimation is still 
far i?om an exact science. There have been many notable examples 
of system development where costs greatly exceeded estimates: for 
example, the Darlington power plant and the Space Shuttle software 
where cost overruns were significantly more than were foreseen. In 
[5], we strongly advocated both initial and continuous cost 
estimation. 
We concede that in many cases, this may still be guesswork. In 
particular, research shows that organizations spend 33% to 50% of 
their total cost of ownership (TCO) on preparing for, or recovering 
from, failures. While hardware costs continue to fall, TCO continues 
to rise and system availability (and hence reliability) is falling [44]. 
Therefore any cost estimates are likely to be unrealistic andlor 
understated. 
However, we still firmly believe that having an estimate of costs, 
and also, ideally, an estimate of anticipated costs were formal 
methods not employed, is essential to convincing the software (and 
hardware) development communities that formal methods can 
indeed produce better systems cheaper. 
I think that God in creating Man somewhat overestimated 
his ability. 
- Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) 
IV. Thou shalt have a formal methods 
guru on call. 
Our experience prior to 1995 was that most successful formal 
methods projects had significant support in the guise of a formal 
methods expert, or “guru”. Many projects had several such gurus 
available to guide and lead the formal development process, to 
provide advice on complex aspects, and in some cases to 
compensate for the lack of experience of the development team in 
applying formal methods. 
Perhaps one might infer l?om this that it suffices to have access 
(occasional or regular) to an expert who is not actually part of the 
team. 
In reality, all members of the software project team must 
understand the applicability of formal methods and contribute in 
ways that help ensure success. It is only too easy for any member of 
a team, whether on the management or technical side, or both, to 
prevent their effective use. Formal methods require effort, expertise, 
and significant knowledge in order to be successful. However, the 
rewards can be great if the right mix of people is available. Not 
everyone in a team needs the same level of proficiency in the 
application of formal methods, but all must have an appreciation of 
their role. Lack of understanding will almost certainly result in 
Unfortunately the copyeditor did not approve of the term. 
disaster. This is perhaps why formal methods are still not trusted in 
some quarters. 
It is still particularly important that the manager of the team 
understands the shift of emphasis of effort towards earlier phases of 
the development cycle (e.g., specification), with the potential to reap 
the rewards in the later phases (e.g., during testing). 
An expert is a person who has made all the mistakes that 
can be made in a v e v  narrowfield. 
-Niels Bohr (1885-1962) 
V. Thou shalt not abandon thy 
traditional development methods. 
In the last decade, the use of UML (Unified Modeling 
Language) has become increasingly important and ubiquitous in 
industrial software development. A criticism that has been leveled at 
UML is its lack of foimality. However, there has been much work 
by the formal methods research community in considering the role 
of formality in the context of UML [13],[25] and a pUML (precise 
UML) group has been formed. Work is underway to allow tool- 
based integration of the B-Method with UML [43]. Even the UML 
community recognizes that improvements could be made in this 
direction and developments in UML are likely to include more 
formal aspects. 
Object-oriented techniques are also widely used and there has 
been much research on object-oriented extensions to formal 
methods, especial the Z notation (for example, Object-Z [42]). In 
addition, there are formal methods tools aimed at object-oriented 
development, such as PerfectDeveloper [ 113. Using such a tool may 
be more attractive to software engineers who are used to developing 
systems using programming languages such as Java. 
Work has also been undertaken to address formality in Model- 
Based Development (MBD), and to increase formality in 
Requirements-Based Programming [37], an approach that aims to 
systematically transform requirements into executable code, having 
many of the advantages of automatic programming, but avoiding 
one major deficiency, namely that automatic programming specifies 
a solution rather than the problem to be solved [35]. 
.4 great many of those who ‘debunk’ traditional ... values 
have in the background values of their own which they 
believe to be immune from the debunking process. 
- C. S. Lewis (1898-1963) The Abolition ofMan 
VI. Thou shalt document sufficiently. 
The IS0 standard for the Z notation was accepted in 2002 after 
nearly a decade of effort in its production [24]. This was perhaps an 
example of over-documentation, since much of the time was spent 
foiinalizing (a revised version 00 the Z notation. However, the 
process did reveal some awkward comers in the semantics, and so 
could be considered a success froin this point of view. But progress 
was slow and painstaking. 
It is felt that in addition to the benefits of abstraction, 
clarification and disambiguation, which accrue fiom the use of 
foimal methods at Level 0 according to OUT classification (see 
Commandment 11), using formal methods at the level of formal 
specification provides invaluable documentation. Experience has 
shown that quality documentation can greatly assist in future system 
maintenance. 
All development involves iteration. It is important that 
documentation reflects that fact. Often when changes are made to 
system implementations, a record of the changes is not made and 
updates are not made to the related documentation. If we truly are 
developing systems formally, formal methods help us to avoid this 
inconsistency, as the formal specification itself forms part of the 
documentation. 
Additionally, proper documentation of decisions made during 
the formal specification process is important. This is why we have 
previously always advocated augmenting formal specifications with 
sufficient natural language narrative. It is critical that a proper 
“paper trail” is available. Abstraction is a very usel l  tool, but it 
requires proper documentation, or it may result in the loss of useful 
information. 
One of the great masters in the use of abstraction was the artist 
Henri Matisse. While most artists prepare preliminary drawings for 
their works, and then greatly expand these, Matisse worked the 
opposite way: his preluninary drawings were extremely detailed. He 
would have his assistant take photographs of his work each evening 
when he had finished working, in order to keep a record of the 
decisions he had made and the work he had completed. Next 
morning he would destroy the work, undoing most (and, sometimes, 
all) of what he had added the previous day. The result is that 
Matisse’s preliminary drawings have a lot of detail, whereas the 
final works are often very abstract, with very few lines, all of which 
are essential to the representation. Perhaps most effectively this is 
seen in his illustrations for James Joyce’s Ulysses (1935).’ 
I have ctlucy~ tried fo hide my own eforts ctnd wished my 
works to haw fhe lighhriress and joyousmss of a springtiirie 
which never lets aiyone suspect lhe Inhoios it cost. 
- Flenri Matisse (1869-1954) 
VII. Thou shalt not compromise thy 
quality standards. 
In 2002, the National Institute of Standards & Technology 
(NIST) estimated that economic losses due to poor software quality 
amounted to more than USS60 billion [34]. Thus the issue of 
software quality is still a huge issue that has yet to be addressed 
adequately. The I S 0  9000 family of quality standards have been in 
force for a significant period now and were revised in 2000. 
Standards are also especially important in high integrity areas 
like safety-critical and security-critical applications. For example, 
the IEC 61508-3 International Standard on software requirements 
with regard to the functional safety of safety-related system covers 
software design, development and verification [23]. Obviously 
formal methods can be used as part of this process. However most 
standards do not mandate formal methods, but rather suggest that 
they could be used. The onus is, rightly, on the developer to 
demonstrate that their use is sensible and worthwhile. 
Other standards take even more consideration of formal methods 
by mandating there use when appropriate. For example, in the UK, 
the two-part Defence Standard 00-55 fiom the Ministry of Defence, 
originally issued in 1991, was reissued in 1997 [32]. Part 1 on 
“Requirements” states: “Assurance that the required safety integrity 
has been achieved is provided by the use of formal methods in 
conjunction with dynamic testing and static analysis.” In addition, 
with regard to safety-related software (SRS): “The methods used in 
the SRS development process shall include all of the following: a) 
formal methods of software specification and design; ...” Part 2 
provides “Guidance” with formal methods mentioned in many 
places and an explicit section included under “Required methods”. 
Safety and security standards continue to play an important 
driving force in the use of formal methods, especially in the 
associated guidance sections and at the highest levels of integrity. It 
is likely that this will carry on for the foreseeable future. 
[f people knew how hard I worked 10 get my master), i t  
wouldn’l seem YO wonctrfiui LII d. 
- Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475-1564) 
VIII. Thou shalt not be dogmatic. 
It is often erroneously claimed that formal methods can 
guarantee correctness [6]. While formal methods can certainly offer 
greater confidence that the software (or hardware) which has been 
developed has been done so correctly, formal methods are no 
absolute guarantee. In fact, it is absurd to speak of “comectness” 
without reference to the system specification [6]. 
However, proving that a system is built “right” (verification) is 
of extremely limited benefit if we’re not building the “right” system 
(validation) [26]. McKenzie [30],[31] examined 1,100 or so deaths 
where the cause of the death was attributed to be due to computer 
error. It was determined that many of the errors were due to 
specifications that were lacking, rather than that the specifications 
were not correctly implemented. 
There is a “gap” (sometimes called the Analysis-Specification 
Gap) in going fiom what is in the mind of the procurer (expressed in 
terms of real world entities) to a specification using the notations of 
software professionals (whether formal or infomial). Because what 
we term “formal methods” in fact offer very little or no 
methodological support (with a few exceptions) [6], it has often 
been suggested that less formal methods are preferable, or that 
formal methods should be augmented with other methods that offer 
greater development support andor are more intuitive to end-users 
(cf. our discussion of the field of method integration under 
Commandment I). Model-Based Development (Ml3D) aims to 
address this by placing great emphasis on achieving an appropriate 
model of reality (cf. Commandment V). And, as we mentioned 
earlier (Commandment V), the field of Requirements-Based 
Programming is attempting to fully integrate requirements in the 
development process. 
Matisse did not even read the book; he illustrated Homer’s 
Odyssey instead. 
5 
And I am unanimous in that! 
-Molly Sugden, a.k.a. Mrs. Slocombe 
Are You Being Served? BBC TJ‘(1972-1993) 
IX. Thou shalt test, test, and test again. 
One of the most widely used results of early formal methods 
research fkom the 1960s (before the term “formal methods” had 
even been coined by the community) is the inclusion of assertions in 
most professionally produced programs [21]. Originally these were 
designed for proving programs correct. However they are now 
normally used for testing purposes to check if a program’s state is 
correct during runtime. There is now promising research based 
around JML (Java Modeling Language) that allows assertions to be 
used both for runtime checking and formal verification [27]. Even 
M e r  into the future, perhaps a ‘‘verifying compiler” will be able to 
verify assertions at compile-time rather than runtime, thus helpful to 
avoid the need to use them for testing [20]. 
For the nearer term, the use of formal methods to improve 
testing seems increasingly promising. A formal specification can aid 
in the automation of generating test cases. In may be that the time 
required to produce a formal specification more than makes up the 
time saved at the testing stage in this regard. In the UK, a 
nationwide network, FORTEST (Formal Methods and Testing) has 
been acting as a 6amework for investigations into the interplay 
between these two aspects [4]. 
In addition, formal methods may be used to clarify testing 
criteria. For example, the MCDC (Modified ConditionDecision 
Coverage) criterion used in many safety-related applications, and 
recommended by standards like the RTCADO-178B Sofiware 
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification 
standard, is normally defined informally, as in this standard. Its 
meaning has been investigated formally using the Z notation and 
developed further into an even stricter RCBC (Reinforced 
Condition/ Decision Coverage) criterion [48]. 
Testing of software has particular problems because it is unique 
in many senses [44]: 
understand. 
Even very short programs can be complex and difficult to 
Software does not deteriorate with age. In fact, it may be 
improved over time by the discovery and correction of latent 
errors. However, new defects may be introduced during 
changes to software. 
Seemingly insignificant changes in software can result in 
significant and unexpected problems in other (seemingly 
unrelated) parts of the code. 
While some hardware can give forewarnings of failure, this 
is not the case with software. Many latent errors in software 
may not be visible until long after the software has been 
deployed. 
A characteristic of software is the speed and ease with which 
it can be changed. 
This last point may give the incorrect impression that software 
errors can easily be found and corrected. Rather, testing must be 
augmented with other verification techniques, and a structured and 
well-documented development approach must be combined to 
ensure a comprehensive validation approach. However, we would 
never, and have never, claimed that the use of formal methods can 
eliminate the need for testing. 
The FDA concludes [46]: “Because of its complexity, the 
development process for software should be even more tightly 
controlled than for hardware, in order to prevent problems that 
cannot be easily detected later in the development process”, and that 
“time is needed to fully define and develop reusable software code 
and to fully understand the behavior of off-the-shelf components.” 
I believe the hard part of building sofmare to be the 
specifcation, design and testing of this conceptual 
construcl, not the labor of representing it and testing the 
fidelity of the representation. 
- Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., No Silver Bullet 
X. Thou shalt reuse. 
Reuse has been promoted as a means of reducing costs and 
achieving greater quality in software development (as greater eKort 
can be justified on improving the quality of components that will be 
reused). Object-oriented and component-based paradigm aim to 
exploit this in developing complex software systems. 
In theory, formal methods can and should aim in promoting 
software reuse [25]. One of the inhibitors to the uptake of software 
reuse has been the ability to identify suitable components in a 
library, and to develop libraries of components that are sufficient 
large to give a reasonable return, and yet small enough to be 
reusable in a variety of situations. For some time it has been 
recognized that searching can be made more effective by having 
formal specifications of components, or at the very least of their 
preconditions (which specify appropriate situations in which the 
component may be applied) and postconditions (which specifies the 
result of using the component). Supplied with such pre and 
postconditions, the component may truly remain a “black box”, 
which allows us to use larger components for which the payoff may 
be more significant. 
There are significant paybacks accruing to exploiting reuse at the 
level of formal specifications rather than at the code level. Formal 
specifications are typically shorter than their equivalent 
implementation in a programming language (see Figure 2 for a 
comparison of the potential size explosion as development proceeds 
60m specification down through to implementation in ha rd~are ) .~  
As such, it is easier to search for components, while simultaneously 
getting a sufficient return. 
There are those researchers who argue that unless a formal 
specification is significantly shorter than its implementation, it 
is worthless. While this is a preferable and normal situation, if 
the formal specification enables an insight that could not be 
achieved at the programming language level, it is of great 
benefit. 
I 25 lines of informal requirements 3. CONCLUSION 
I 250 lines o f  (formal) specification -1 
I 2,500 lines of design description 
I 25,000 lines of high-level program code I 
1 250,000 machine instructions of object code 1 
I 2,500,000 transistors in hardware I 
Oui, I’ouvre sort plus belle 
D’une forme au travail 
Rebelle, 
Vers, marbre. onyx, Pmail. 
v e s ,  the work comes out more beautiful fiom a material that 
resists the process, verse, marble, onyx, or enamel.] 
- ThCophile Gautier (181 1-1872) Liirf  
Figure 2: The size explosion as development progresses. 
Additionally, formal specifications may be used to generate 
implementations on various platforms, reusing the effort expended 
at the earlier stages of the development process, and reducing the 
overall cost. In particular, success has been reported in applying 
foimal specification techniques to developing product lines, 
whereby a range of similar systems (or products) that have 
significantly similar properties, with slight variations between them, 
are implemented. Moreover, formal methods generally result in a 
cleaner architecture [26], making a system more efficient and more 
easily maintainable in die future. 
However. care must be taken when reusing and porting software. 
Ariane 5 is a prime example, where it was assumed that the same 
launch software used in the prior version (Ariane 4) could be reused. 
The result was the loss of the rocket within seconds of launch [29]. 
Similarly, the Therac-25 incidents are an interesting and relevant 
example of, arguably, the most significant failure of software 
assurance in the medical/biological field [38]. Therac-25 was a dual- 
mode linear accelerator that could deliver either photons at 25 MeV 
or electrons at various energy levels. It was based on Therac-20, 
which in turn was based on the single-mode Therac-6. While 
Therac-20 included hardware interlocks for safety, in Therac-25 
these were software-based. Despite several Therac-25 machines 
operating, reportedly correctly, for up to 4 years at various 
installations in the US, 6 incidents occurred where the device gave 
massive (and lethal) doses of radiation to patients. 
Subsequent investigations discovered that “creative” setting of 
parameters by students at a radiology school regularly resulted in 
Therac-20 machines shutting down due to blown fuses and breakers. 
In fact, in transpired that Therac-20 incorporated the same software 
error as Therac-25, but what was merely a nuisance in Therac-20 
(due to mechanical interlocks) was a fatal problem with Therac-25 
[28]. The problem was “inherited” and exacerbated in Therac-25 
[3 81. 
The biggest diflerence between time and space is that you 
can’t reuse time. 
- Merrick Furst 
Formal methods can have a great deal of impact on the software 
development lifecycle. Unfomately, it is much easier to use formal 
methods inappropriately than it is to apply them successfully, unless 
a great deal of engineering skill and expert knowledge is used. All 
members of the team must understand the applicability of formal 
methods to a software project and contribute in ways that help 
ensure success. It is only too easy for any member of a team, 
whether on the management or technical side, or both, to prevent 
their effective use. 
Formal methods do require effort, expertise, and significant 
knowledge, in order to be successfully applied. However the 
rewards can be worthwhile if the right mix of people is available. 
Not everyone in a team needs the same level of proficiency in the 
application of formal methods, but all must have an appreciation of 
their role. Lack of understanding will almost certainly result in 
disaster. This is perhaps why formal methods are distrusted in some 
quarters. 
A traditional problem of formal methods has been their 
overselling by some, especially in academia. They cannot solve all 
problems and they are certainly not completely reliable since 
humans, as well as mathematics, are involved and the logical models 
must relate to the real world in an informal leap of faith, in any case, 
both at the high-level requirements or specification end, and at the 
low-level digital hardware end (where ultimately we must believe 
Maxurell’s equations, for example!). Formal methods are not a 
panacea, but rather they are a useful tool in reducing errors in 
computer-based systems when applied sensibly, in cost-effective 
ways, and for appropriate parts of the development. 
There should be more effort to evaluate the effectiveness of 
formal methods in the software development and maintenance 
process. It is hoped that this paper suggests some issues for 
consideration in future studies that we believe would be worthwhile. 
Because of the somewhat tarnished reputation of formal methods, 
largely due to misunderstandings and inappropriate use, a 
demonstration of how and where formal methods are effective 
would be well worthwhile. There are success stories in the industrial 
use of formal methods. What are needed are studies that can help 
practitioners understand how to ensure that the introduction of 
formal methods has a positive impact on the software development 
and maintenance process, by reducing overall costs. 
While the use of formal methods has not developed as fast as it 
might have done over the last ten years, it has not gone away either. 
We believe that formal methods are not just a passing fad, but that 
they will always have a niche in software development, especially 
when it is critically important that the software functions coirectly 
(e.g., for safety or security reasons). The use of software in such 
applications is increasing as in many areas and fomial methods are 
one of the available techniques that should be considered vely 
carehlly. They should be applied in the parts of the software that 
perform critical operations at a level that makes economic sense 
using engineering judgment. For that, well-trained personnel of the 
highest quality will always be needed. 
For the next ten years, we see tool support for formal methods 
as being of great importance. Industrial-strength tools for formal 
methods have always been lacking. There are a few examples, such 
as Atelier-B and PerfectDeveloper, but we need a range of such 
tools, perhaps compatible using XML interchange formats for 
example [47]. There are some efforts in this direction. E.g., see the 
CZT Community Z Tools initiative [32] and the European RODIN 
Project on Rigorous Open Development Environment for Complex 
Systems based around B’ [ 13, a development of the B-Method. It is 
hoped that such advances will make formal methods increasingly 
easy to justify and use in an industrial environment. 
.., in this area my academic colleagues are doing exactly 
what they should do: developing and propagating an 
indispensable technology so that it will be available when 
“the world out there” undeniably needs it. [12] 
- Edsger W. Dijkstra (193g2002) 
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